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Introduction
The European Union (EU) has set itself the strategic goal 
of integrating its capital markets by 2005. Until recently, 
priority was given to streamlining trading operations. 
It has now been generally recognised that post-trade 
processing, i.e. the clearing and settlement of securi-
ties trades, is also an important strategic element in the 
integration of capital markets. For a given level of trading 
costs, lower post-trade transaction costs can be expected 
to increase market liquidity and thus to provide corporates 
with easier access to securities markets.
With the growing number of cross-border trades, concern 
has arisen about the overly fragmented nature of the EU 
securities clearing and settlement industry. Several studies 
have shown that the settling of cross-border trades within 
the EU is several times more expensive than the handling 
of a local trade between local participants (1).
Although there is today a general consensus that the 
solution should be market driven, public authorities must 
join in this debate. First, the organisation of an efﬁ  cient 
infrastructure for settling cross-border trades throughout 
the EU will require the removal of existing barriers to com-
petition. Second, cross-border settlements do raise spe-
ciﬁ  c ﬁ  nancial stability issues. They are more complex and 
potentially more risky. Moreover, when the settlement of 
trades becomes more concentrated, overseers and super-
visors need to keep a closer eye on the system involved, as 
any disruption could have a bigger systemic impact.
The debate on the future of the securities clearing 
and settlement industry is often animated, with play-
ers defending their own interests. Some custodians 
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argue that (International) Central Securities Depositories 
((I)CSDs) should not provide settlement services except 
for limited securities safekeeping and settlement func-
tions, thus de facto advocating the splitting off of the 
settlement-enhancing banking functions exercised by 
these entities. Exchanges that own the settlement system 
through which their trades pass are said to be liable to let 
their own interests prevail over those of the settlement 
system users. In this paper we will try to discuss the legiti-
macy of such statements and see if adequate solutions are 
available for the issues raised.
This note is structured as follows. The ﬁ  rst chapter looks 
at the current organisation of post-trade processing func-
tions and identiﬁ  es which institutions are involved in the 
clearing and settlement of both domestic and cross-
border trades. The forces for change in the actual EU 
clearing and settlement environment are also described. 
Chapter two discusses efﬁ  ciency criteria for an efﬁ  cient 
EU securities clearing and settlement industry while chap-
ter three looks at soundness criteria with regard to the 
industry. Finally, a conclusion is presented.
1.  Current organisation of post-trade 
processing
1.1 Market  functions
The processing chain of a securities transaction involves 
several steps (Chart 1). After the conclusion of a transac-
tion, a number of post-trade operations takes place. They 
(1)  See e.g. Lannoo, K. and Levin, M. (2001).84
always involve settlement, but an intermediary phase, 
the interposition of a central counterparty, might also be 
foreseen. Settlement presupposes the holding of cash and 
securities, the latter requiring a registrar function.
1.1.1 Trading
A securities trade is concluded between a buyer and a 
seller by agreeing on the security’s price and the volume 
sold. The trade can be executed in an exchange, a system 
that is designed to optimise the price-discovery process 
and to concentrate liquidity, and where the trading usu-
ally takes place anonymously. Sometimes, however, a 
market which functions bilaterally over the counter (OTC) 
proves to be the most effective solution. In both cases, 
buyers and sellers can act for their own account or for 
their client’s account.
1.1.2 Clearing
The clearing of a trade generally means that the obliga-
tions of the buyer and the seller are established. The 
counterparty risk that the buyer and seller incur vis-à-vis 
each other can be standardised. To this end, a clearing 
house may interpose itself as a central counterparty (CCP) 
after the conclusion of the trade, becoming the buyer 
counterparty for the seller and the seller counterparty for 
the buyer. (2) Legally speaking, novation takes place. Both 
original parties – either directly or indirectly via a CCP 
member – now have a claim on the CCP, a specialised 
entity that is subject to stringent risk management. This 
intervention is all the more important when the original 
counterparties have concluded the trade through an 
exchange or a trading system which guarantees anonym-
ity and, consequently, did not provide the opportunity to 
include in the pricing of the trade the correct valuation of 
the counterparty risk incurred.
Besides this, the CCP facilitates efﬁ  cient application of a 
multilateral netting mechanism, as it will always be the 
counterparty for each trade that the original counterpar-
ties have agreed to clear through the CCP. When netting 
takes place, by novation, a new claim replaces the accu-
mulated claims between the CCP and its member, which 
are crossed out. This way, the use of the CCP reduces 
the capital requirements for the CCP-participant, which is 
usually a credit institution or an investment ﬁ  rm.
1.1.3 Settlement
After conclusion of the trade, settlement has to take place, 
i.e. the seller has to deliver the securities to the buyer and 
the buyer has to pay the agreed price to the seller. This 
usually takes place on a rolling basis two or three days 
after the trade day. Settlement takes place between the 
buyer and the seller, or between their respective settle-
ment agents. When a CCP has intervened, settlement will 
take place between the buyer and the CCP, and between 
the seller and the CCP. Where the cash and the securities 
are held on accounts, the transfer of cash and securities, 
i.e. the settlement of the trade, takes place by debiting 
and crediting those accounts. A generally accepted coun-
terparty risk mitigation technique is the Delivery versus 
Payment (DvP) procedure, implying that the ﬁ  nal  cash 
payment and ﬁ  nal securities delivery between buyer and 
seller take place simultaneously.
1.1.4 Custody
Settlement presupposes that cash and securities are 
held somewhere. Unlike settlement, custody is a static 
process. The risk proﬁ   le for holding cash differs from 
that for holding securities. When cash is deposited with 
a bank, the depositor has a claim on that bank, and not 
on the currency issuing central bank. In contrast, when 
securities are held with a depository, the depositor still 
has a proprietary claim vis-à-vis the issuer of the security. 
The depository merely acts as a safekeeper. Usually, this 
right of ownership is legally structured as a co-proprietary 
(2)  Not all markets have a CCP arrangement for clearing. However, in this paper,
 clearing will be deﬁ  ned as the interposition of a clearing house as a CCP.
Source : NBB.
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right on a securities pool to make the securities fungible, 
i.e. interchangeable. The depository usually also offers 
corporate event services, such as capital redemption or 
coupon payments.
1.1.5 Registrar  function
The registrar is the entity that has a direct relation-
ship with the issuer of the securities. It will also act 
as a “notary” in respect of the issue. It will hold in 
custody in its books all the securities of a given issue, 
and thus occupy the top place of the pyramid in the 
holding chain; this enables it to centralise and control 
the overall securities holdings position. The jurisdiction 
in which the registrar-depository is located will deﬁ  ne 
the speciﬁ  c legal characteristics of the security, such as 
its form (bearer security or dematerialised security) or 
other speciﬁ  c points (rules on corporate actions such 
as dividend payments and rights issues, etc.). Indirectly, 
these characteristics can inﬂ  uence the efﬁ  ciency of the 
settlement of this security and the risks involved. When 
the participants of the registrar in turn hold securities 
in custody for their clients, a multi-tiered ownership 
structure arises.
1.2  Institutions involved in the handling of 
domestic trades in a traditional structure
At each functional stage, speciﬁ  c  infrastructures  are 
involved in order to increase the efﬁ  ciency and the sound-
ness of the trading and post-trading process. In traditional 
domestic regulated markets the local trading, clearing and 
settlement systems involved in a securities transaction are 
often vertically integrated, i.e., there is one and only one 
chain of infrastructures for a transaction to pass through. 
The direct participant in these systems is traditionally 
a domestic institution, and the bulk of transactions is 
traded, cleared or settled by these institutions. In some 
cases, the trading, clearing and settlement systems are 
owned by different legal entities. In other cases, the post-
trade systems are owned by the exchange itself.(3) Even in 
the case of private ownership, the public character of the 
systems is traditionally reﬂ   ected in domestic regulation 
or approval by a public authority. This means of process-
ing securities trades functioned very well in the pre-euro 
environment.
Trading takes place through the local exchange where 
the domestic securities are listed, or on the bilateral OTC 
market for these domestic securities.
Not all markets use a CCP. The intervention of a CCP is 
generally the rule for exchange-traded derivatives such as 
futures and options. However, it is much less so for cash 
market transactions, while only a very small fraction of 
overall OTC trades – and especially ﬁ  xed-income markets –
are cleared via a CCP.
Securities transactions are traditionally settled through 
the local Central Securities Depository (CSD), with the 
local central bank acting as the cash settlement agent 
for the CSD participants. Indeed, the most efﬁ  cient set-
tlement method supposes that participants centralise 
their cash and securities holdings. The cash is then held 
with the central bank, where most CSD participants 
have an account. Likewise, the domestic securities are 
held, by those same participants, in the CSD. Both the 
central bank and the CSD intervene during the settle-
ment operation. In this case, the securities settlement 
process consists of the relevant procedures carried out 
by both the central bank and the CSD. The CSD/central 
bank combination is called a Securities Settlement 
System (SSS). Of course, both the buyer and the seller 
of the securities can have their securities accounts and 
their cash accounts with one and the same institution. 
This is the case if a central bank operates an SSS itself. 
Alternatively, settlement can take place internally in the 
books of an SSS-participant.
The CSD usually also acts as the registrar of the domestic 
securities, although the registrar function might be exer-
cised by a separate local entity.
Table 1  lists the different national exchanges together 
with the clearing and settlement systems they are using, 
including ICSDs. Settlement institutions may also process 
OTC trades.
1.3  Handling of clearing and settlement of cross-
border trades
In a cross-border trade, a non-domestic end-user has to 
settle the securities trade and the processing becomes 
more complex than for settling between domestic par-
ticipants. This problem is not new, and various proce-
dures have been developed in the past to handle the 
settlement of cross-border trades. This section brieﬂ  y 
reviews the existing handling procedures which are 
illustrated in chart 2.
(3)  Examples of the former are the UK systems comprising the London Stock Exchange 
and Liffe at the trading level, the London Clearing House at the clearing level and 
CREST at the settlement level; the Deutsche Börse trade and post-trade systems 
are an example of the latter.86
1.3.1  Direct remote participation
An SSS/CSD or a CCP can be accessed from abroad. 
Nevertheless, directly accessing a remote clearing or set-
tlement system still proves to be a costly approach, as the 
remote participant has to cope with a speciﬁ  c procedure 
and interface for each system accessed. The back-ofﬁ  ce 
costs involved can be substantial. So, the number of 
remote participants in clearing and settlement systems 
has only gradually risen over recent years, in spite of 
the 1993 European Investment Services Directive which 
requires EU Member States to implement non-discrimina-
tory access to clearing and settlement systems by remote 
participants/trading members.
1.3.2  Indirect participation - Role of custodians
Since accessing an SSS directly from abroad does not offer 
the most efﬁ  cient solution, many ﬁ  nancial institutions use 
a custodian bank that acts as their transaction settlement 
agent. In some cases, the volumes settled by the custodian 
prove to be substantial. A custodian will usually settle the 
trades between its own participants internally in its own 
books. As a consequence, a tiered structure emerges, 
TABLE 1 CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN EUROPE
Sources: Lannoo, K. and Levin, M. (2001); NBB.
Country/ICSD Trading Clearing Settlement
BE Euronext Brussels Clearnet CIK, NBB SSS
DK Copenhagen Stock Exchange FUTOP (derivatives) VP, FUTOP
DE 8 stock exchanges Clearstream Banking Frankfurt 
(no CCP), Eurex Clearing
Clearstream Banking Frankfurt
HE HELEX Exchanges S.A. HDAT No CCP for securities, 
ADECH is CCP for derivatives
BOGS, CSD S.A.
ES 4 stock exchanges, CADE, MEFF No CCP for securities, 
MEFacts as CCP for derivatives
SVLV, SCLV, CADE
FR Euronext Paris Clearnet Euroclear France
IE Irish Stock Exchange CREST (Euroclear UK)
IT Borsa Italiana S. p A. LDT, CCG (but no CCP) Monte Titoli
LU Luxembourg Stock Exchange Clearstream Banking Luxembourg 
(but no CCP)
Clearstream Banking Luxembourg
NL Euronext Amsterdam Clearnet Euroclear Netherlands
AT Vienna Stock Exchange, NEWEX OeKB Clearstream Banking Frankfurt 
(but no CCP)
OeKB Clearstream Banking Frankfurt
PT BVLP, MTS Portugal Interbolsa Interbolsa, SITEME
FI HEX APK (but no CCP) APK
SE OM Stockholm Exchange VPC
UK 9 regulated markets LCH (CCP), OM CREST (Euroclear UK)
Clearstream
International
Clears and settles securities transactions in 33 markets 
through a network of links
Euroclear Bank Clears and settles securities transactions in 33 markets 
through a network of links87
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whereby the settlement activity may be concentrated 
partly on the lower level of the holding chain. When a 
custodian internalises a substantial amount of settlement 
activity, it is often called a quasi-system. Custodian activi-
ties are not restricted to settlement services, as custodians 
also offer related products such as portfolio investment 
valuation services, and their customer base differs and 
routinely comprises pension funds, for example. Global 
custodians offer settlement services for securities held in 
central securities depositories world-wide, while local cus-
todians provide access to their domestic CSD.
1.3.3  Role of ICSDs
The Belgium- and Luxembourg-based ICSDs are a special 
kind of SSS. ICSDs have the legal status of a credit insti-
tution and hold both the cash and securities accounts 
of their participants in their books. Contrary to what its 
name might suggest, an ICSD does not act as a central 
securities depository, except perhaps – in a speciﬁ  c way –
through the use of “common depository” banks for 
eurobonds. Indeed, the original purpose of ISCDs was 
the settlement of eurobonds denominated in various 
currencies. Later on, their cross-border settlement activ-
ity in other ﬁ  xed-income products, such as government 
bonds, became more important. Nowadays, the bulk of 
EU cross-border ﬁ  xed-income trades is settled through 
ICSDs. Recently they became involved in the equities 
settlement business. Unlike custodians, ICSDs are de 
facto limited purpose banks, exclusively offering settle-
ment services and closely related settlement enhancing 
services.
(4)  See in this respect e.g. the September 2001 ECB press release on the Eurosystem’s 
policy line with regard to consolidation in central counterparty clearing. 
CHART 2  HANDLING OF CROSS-BORDER SETTLEMENT OF A 
SECURITIES TRADE









1.3.4  Indirect participation - Linked SSSs/ICSDs
Instead of accessing a foreign SSS through a custodian, a 
user can access the SSS through another SSS. The latter 
SSS, called the “investor SSS”, will hold the securities 
for its client-user with the SSS that acts as the CSD, 
called the “registrar SSS”. Those SSSs are then said to 
be linked.
1.4  Forces driving change in the EU clearing and 
settlement environment
The internationalisation of securities markets has greatly 
increased the number of cross-border trades. This in turn 
has revealed the drawbacks and costs of the fragmenta-
tion in the EU post-trade securities handling industry for 
its users, both investors and issuers.
1.4.1  Growing number of cross-border trades
Both the introduction of the euro and the development 
of new technologies have contributed to the internation-
alisation of the securities market. Before the introduction 
of the euro, the bulk of domestic securities were bought 
by local investors, and the market liquidity was logically 
concentrated on domestic traders. The best option for for-
eign investors was to use local traders to conclude a trade. 
The euro generated growing cross-border investment in 
both  ﬁ   xed-income products and equities, and remote 
traders gained a wider client base so that they could play 
a bigger role. Technological innovation has also inﬂ  uenced 
the operation of both exchanges and OTC securities mar-
kets. When information technology made it feasible to 
organise markets without requiring the physical presence 
of their trading members, it became cost-efﬁ  cient  for 
trading members to trade from abroad.
1.4.2  Euro area payment infrastructure
It can be argued that each currency zone needs its “own” 
payments infrastructure. With the introduction of the 
euro, from a currency perspective, the traditional distinc-
tion between domestic and foreign Securities Clearing or 
Settlement Systems (SCSSs) blurred, and several CCPs or 
CSDs became active within one and the same currency 
zone. So, the euro area should strive to obtain a euro pay-
ments infrastructure (4). On the other hand, some SCSSs 
– particularly ICSDs – operate in a multi-currency envi-
ronment and service participants that are mainly located 
outside the euro area.88
1.4.3  Stock exchange requirements
Trade execution and the subsequent settlement of a trade 
are complementary services, and users are shopping for 
a package (trade conclusion and settlement) rather than 
an isolated service. This is reﬂ  ected in the demand for 
straight-through-processing (STP), enabling the seamless 
conclusion and processing of a trade. Thus, exchanges do 
have an interest in the post-trade environment. Within 
the logic of the chain linking trading, clearing and settle-
ment, a trading platform will seek an integrated clearing 
and settlement solution. So, with mergers taking place at 
trading level, this creates pressure to speed up integration 
at the clearing and settlement level.
1.4.4 Pressures to reduce costs of post-trade handling 
services
As a corollary of the ever-growing internationalisation 
of trading activity, investors are now demanding efﬁ  -
cient and sound post-trade treatment of cross-border 
securities transactions. When accessing several systems, 
a participant wants the system interfaces and proce-
dures to be as harmonised as possible. Not surpris-
ingly, system participants ask for “interoperability” of 
the systems they use. In the current EU environment, 
some twenty securities settlement or clearing systems 
are in operation, and the objective will not be easy to 
achieve.
The amount of fees paid to settlement providers increases 
the longer the chain of intermediaries, but a chain is 
unavoidable for most investors wishing to access local 
payment systems and the local CSDs. A longer chain 
often requires manual handling of part of the process, 
which increases the number of errors. Apart from this, 
costs also include the so-called pipeline-costs, i.e. the 
cost of the capital or securities temporarily tied up in the 
settlement process.
Measuring the costs incurred by a settlement service user 
is not a straightforward issue. Lannoo, K. and Levin, M. 
(2001) have conducted such an exercise and their ﬁ  nd-
ings were cited in the Giovannini report (2001). The 
authors themselves warned that their study suffered 
from considerable methodological problems and a lack 
of clear data, preventing precise comparison. However, 
one clear result is that the highest costs are not the 
direct costs, such as fees to settlement providers, but 
the indirect costs, such as back-ofﬁ   ce costs borne by 
system participants. Hence, higher overall EU costs can 
be attributed to the fragmented nature of the EU clear-
ing and settlement infrastructure. A second ﬁ  nding  is 
that in-system settlement is always cheaper than cross-
system settlement. Finally, Lannoo and Levin compared 
EU to US settlement costs, using the operating income 
of settlement systems as a proxy. As can be inferred from 
table 2, the use of netting is much more extensive in the 
US Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC) 
systems, leading to much lower settlement costs per 
transaction, on a pre-netted basis. The fact that netting 
is less used or less effective in the EU explains why the 
EU/US cost ratio is higher on a pre-netted basis. Also, 
they found that ICSDs have higher operating income 
per transaction, reﬂ   ecting the complexity of settling 
international transactions whose costs are internalised 
by the ICSDs. It thus appeared that the in-system set-
tlement costs charged by EU CSDs – excluding ICSDs 
–, when corrected for the less frequent use of netting, 
were found to be comparable to US settlement costs 
(ratio 1.08 : 1).
As the rationalisation of the SCSS industry should drive 
down the costs of post-trade handling, it will be beneﬁ  -
cial for both investors in securities and securities issuers. 
However, as illustrated in box 1, the interests involved are 
quite diverse, which explains why progress is difﬁ  cult to 
achieve in this ﬁ  eld.
TABLE 2 FOUR OPTIONS FOR CALCULATING OPERATING 
INCOME PER TRANSACTION (1)
Source: Lannoo, K. and Levin, M. (2001).
(1) The comparison of pre-netting to post-netting ratios reveals the consequences 
of the non-generalised implementation of netting in the EU. Inclusion of the ICSD 
figures adds complex international transactions, whose costs are internalised 
by the ICSDs.
Pre-netting Post-netting
with ICSDs EU: € 3.10 EU: € 5.14
DTCC: € 0.40 DTCC: € 2.77
Ratio: 7.75 : 1 Ratio: 1.86 : 1
without ICSDs EU: € 1.74 EU: € 2.98
DTCC: € 0.40 DTCC: € 2.77
Ratio: 4.35 : 1 Ratio: 1.08 : 189
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Interests of SCSS industry participants
System operator
The operator is the administrator of the system responsible for its overall management. In its traditional 
domestic environment, a CSD/SSS has a quasi-monopoly. Generally, public regulation deﬁ  nes the limits of 
its activity. However, a CSD/SSS can also function within the framework of a co-operative structure that can 
therefore be inﬂ  uenced by its user-participants. In some cases, central banks – traditionally the operators of 
high-value cash payment systems – do also act as a CSD, usually for domestic public sector bonds. In that 
case, the central bank operates a CSD/SSS, holding both the securities accounts and the cash accounts of 
the system.
System service provider
A system service provider delivers services to the system operator or to its participants. As an obvious example, 
the system operator can use an IT-provider for the programming, the operation and / or the maintenance of the IT 
needed for the system to function. Likewise, software vendors provide interfaces enabling the system’s participants 
to access the system. A speciﬁ  c service is the provision of cash accounts to SSS participants, as those are neces-
sary for the SSS to function. Central banks can provide the cash accounts used to settle securities transactions in 
the SSS. Traditionally, the local central bank acts as the sole cash settlement agent for each direct SSS participant. 
Alternatively, the cash settlement accounts can be provided by a selection of settlement banks or by the system 
operator itself, provided it is a bank.
System participant
A system participant has the choice of becoming a direct SSS participant or accessing the system indirectly. Direct 
participants are mainly credit institutions and include investment ﬁ  rms. The speciﬁ  c character of their activities may 
create diverse needs  : they may be active traders settling huge volumes, or they may hold securities for a longer 
period; they may operate mainly locally or be internationally oriented; they may have sufﬁ  cient cash/collateral 
available or they may not, and so on. CCPs and other SSSs are speciﬁ  c categories of SSS participants. System users 
have an obvious interest in the soundness, efﬁ  ciency and interoperability of the systems. They are also sensitive to 
the network effects of the systems used, which implies that size matters and they seek a “critical mass”. On the 
other hand, system users may at the same time be in competition with the system by “internalising” clearing or 
settlement activity, so that their relationship with the system is ambiguous.
A speciﬁ  c system user is the central bank that uses the SSS to accept securities collateral when providing credit, 
e.g. for monetary policy operations. Central bank operations are only a minor part of the overall securities market 
transactions. Nonetheless, the central banks belonging to the European System of Central Banks (ESCB) are espe-
cially concerned about the SSSs they use. In 1998, in the run-up to EMU, they promulgated the “Standards for 
the use by EU central banks of SSSs for ESCB credit operations”.
Financial centre
Finally, it is clear that the SCSS industry is considered by most countries as a sensitive issue, related to questions 
of competition between ﬁ  nancial centres. This seems to be particularly the case for “national” stocks traded on 
a national exchange, whereas there is much greater acceptance of the fact that OTC ﬁ  xed-income trades are set-
tled abroad. Of course, exchanges are bound to worry about trades being settled in a sound and efﬁ  cient way. 
But part of the underlying reason might be the fear that the trading activity could relocate once the post-trade 
facilities are reorganised.
Box 1
2. Efﬁ  ciency
An SCSS which functions well has to meet the two funda-
mental criteria of efﬁ  ciency and stability. Although those 
two criteria will be reviewed successively in this and the 
next chapter, it is important to remember that they are 
closely linked. On the one hand, resilience to shocks is an 
obvious prerequisite for an efﬁ  cient system. On the other 
hand, in the design of systems, trade-offs have sometimes 
to be made between cost-efﬁ  ciency and stability.90
In this chapter, we have a closer look at efﬁ  ciency consider-
ations. In order to arrange an efﬁ  cient SCSS industry, it will 
ﬁ  rst be necessary to create an environment ensuring proper 
access, compatibility and interoperability between the exist-
ing systems, so as to open up clearing and settlement sys-
tems to competitive pressures. This will require the removal 
of barriers. This new environment will then reshape the 
structure of EU clearing and settlement, possibly leading to 
a more integrated clearing and settlement industry. Finally, 
once this condition is satisﬁ  ed, it is important to ensure that 
users get enough beneﬁ  ts from the new environment, in 
particular if dominant integrated systems emerge.
2.1  Removal of barriers to a single market for 
securities clearing and settlement services
International market players want to extend the reach 
of the SSS network. Any settlement services provider 
wishing to offer settlement services in a security for 
which it is not the registrar CSD will need to link directly 
or indirectly to the relevant registrar CSD. When these 
registrar CSDs are owned by different entities, questions 
of interoperability and co-ordination of service quality 
become very important. In this respect, the Group of 
Thirty, a body composed mainly of settlement system 
users and public sector ofﬁ   cials acting in a personal, 
advisory capacity, has published a report  (5) calling  for 
the interoperability of securities clearing and settlement 
systems. Among other things, this implies harmonisa-
tion of SCSS messaging standards and communication 
protocols, to permit the seamless transfer of information 
between the different systems.
In addition, EU CSDs themselves have indicated that 
they want to make their services compatible with those 
of other CSDs. In this respect, the Central Securities 
Settlement Institution (CSSI), as described in Deutsche 
Bank Research (2003), should be mentioned. This project 
envisages the standardisation of messages between the 
CSDs involved, i.e. the Euroclear group CSDs, Clearstream 
Bank Frankfurt, Monte Titoli and the Swiss SIS. The project 
should facilitate the efﬁ  cient cross-border settlement of 
equities. CSSI clients would be conﬁ  ned to the participat-
ing CSDs. Production-side economies of scale seem to be 
an important motive for this scheme.
At the same time, the European Commission itself has 
acknowledged that the existing clearing and settlement 
structure is itself a barrier to an integrated EU capital 
market. In the light of the European Commission (1999) 
action plan aiming at the creation of a single market for 
ﬁ  nancial services by 2005, the Commission is considering 
the reorganisation of the securities clearing and settlement 
industry, eventually by means of a legislative initiative. In 
its market consultation paper on clearing and settlement 
in the EU (2002), the Commission’s starting point is the 
overly fragmented structure of the EU securities clearing 
and settlement industry and the consequent costs. Setting 
up a competitive environment would increase the degree 
of consolidation and reduce the costs. The Commission 
identiﬁ  es two priorities : the removal of barriers to compe-
tition between systems, and the creation of a level playing 
ﬁ  eld between institutions.
The November  2001 report of the Giovannini group 
– acting as an advisory body of market participants to 
the European Commission – enumerated ﬁ  fteen  bar-
riers to efﬁ  cient cross-system clearing and settlement 
in the following categories  : national differences in 
technical requirements, in market practice and in tax 
procedures and, ﬁ  nally, issues relating to legal certainty. 
A second report of the group, issued in April  2003, 
deﬁ  nes a strategy for removing these barriers, taking 
into account their importance and their interdependen-
cies, with due regard for both cost efﬁ  ciency and risk 
minimisation. For the removal of each barrier, a time 
schedule and the responsible entity have been speci-
ﬁ   ed. As can be seen from chart 3, the Giovannini II 
report proposes an ambitious time schedule, indicating 
that all barriers should be removed within three years. 
The ultimate goal is to guarantee both the issuer and 
the investor the choice of location of clearing and 
settlement services. This should ultimately result in 
market-led integration of the clearing and settlement 
infrastructure. The path followed and the ﬁ  nal outcome 
will depend on the market, but it is essential that issu-
ers and investors reap the beneﬁ  ts of the changes. This 
integrated post-trade infrastructure should also take 
into account the public policy issues of cost efﬁ  ciency, 
competition and systemic stability, and the regulatory 
and supervisory structure for enforcement should be 
able to function on a pan-European basis.
Another aspect addressed in the European Commission’s 
market consultation paper mentioned above is the need to 
create a level playing ﬁ  eld between institutions and to avoid 
regulatory arbitrage. Institutions active in the SCSS industry 
are increasingly entering the domains traditionally pre-
served for other categories of institutions. So, CSDs which 
do not have bank status and which, as a consequence, are 
not authorised to provide cash accounts or cash credit, 
feel at a disadvantage vis-à-vis custodians, which can offer 
these “core” settlement services. From another point of 
view, custodian banks which do offer these services, claim 
(5)  Group of Thirty (2003), “Global clearing and settlement – A plan of action”.91
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Source : Giovannini Group (2003).
CHART 3  Timeline for removing the barriers to an efficient clearing and settlement environment
Different operating hours/settlement deadlines
Diversity of IT platforms/interfaces
Absence of intra-day settlement finality
Differences in standard settlement periods
Different rules governing corporate actions
Conflicts of laws
Legal treatment of netting
Absence of EU-wide framework of laws
Restrictions on tax collection
Restrictions on withholding agents
Restrictions on location of clearing and settlements
Restrictions on location of securities
Impediments to remote access
Primary dealer restrictions
Preparatory phase Removal phase
Differences in securities issuance
within 2 years
within 2 years and 3 months
within 3 years
that they alone should be able to do so, while CSD and 
ISCD activity should be restricted to a very limited sub-ﬁ  eld 
of core settlement services, excluding the extension of cash 
credit and the securities lending facility, for example. ICSDs 
in turn argue that custodian banks can propose settlement 
services comparable to the ones they offer without having 
to cope with similar standards, such as the need to be a 
limited purpose bank or to fully mitigate all extension of 
credit and securities lending.
Besides this speciﬁ   c consultation regarding EU clearing 
and settlement, the European Commission is addressing 
this issue in two other ways. The ﬁ  rst is in the context of 
the Investment Services Directive upgrading which aims to 
forbid Member States to unnecessarily restrict investment 
ﬁ  rms’ rights of access to and choice of clearing and set-
tlement systems.
The second concerns an initiative of the Directorate-General 
for Competition which, as an investigative authority, is 
currently examining whether the system practices regard-
ing access conditions and pricing policies comply with 
Articles 81 and following of the EU Treaty.
2.2  Building a more integrated clearing and 
settlement services industry
The removal of barriers will inﬂ  uence the consolidation 
process in the SCSS and, in particular, will stimulate the 
emergence of large service providers. This development is 
already taking place. The underlying factors are reviewed 
in this section. In such a context, it is important to prevent 
distortion of competition by ensuring adequate organisa-
tion and governance structures. These aspects are exam-
ined in the next section.
Further concentration of the EU clearing and settlement 
industry is very likely. One may refer to the US experi-
ence, where the equities markets moved from a system 
of seven CSDs owned by exchanges to one CSD and one 
CCP, so that clearing and settlement for the US equities 
markets now takes place through the single facilities of 
the DTCC. Separate facilities exist for other categories of 
products. US government bond transactions are mainly 
settled through two big US-based custodian banks. 
Separate single facilities also exist for mortgage bonds 
and exchange traded options.92
In the EU, too, the existence of economies of scope and 
economies of scale will favour the emergence of very 
large service providers.
On the one hand, the settlement service is composed of a 
package of complementary services. The holding of cash 
accounts, the holding of securities accounts and a set-
tlement mechanism constitute the basic complementary 
services (complements) of an SSS. Other relevant comple-
ments include the provision of cash credit and securities 
lending mechanisms to facilitate settlement. The poten-
tial beneﬁ  t that might result from integrated provision of 
those various services is one factor that could shape the 
consolidation process in the industry.
On the other hand, SSSs are networks (6) that display posi-
tive consumption externalities and production economies 
of scale. As a consequence, a monopoly in the services 
provided tends to develop more quickly, in the absence 
of barriers. This might lead to the emergence of a fully 
integrated SCSS industry instead of a set of separate but 
interoperable systems.
Any single SSS – be it an ICSD or a CSD / NCB-combination –
takes advantage of the existence of consumption network 
externalities. Just as nobody will buy a fax machine if he is 
the only one to do so, nobody will use a settlement system 
if he is the only one to use it. Settlement that takes place on 
accounts belonging to the same system is an entirely differ-
ent operation from settlement involving accounts in two or 
more systems. For a given security, the utility derived from 
using an SSS will increase with the number of participants 
using the system. And for a given number of participants, 
the same applies for an increase in the number of securities 
processed and the number of trades settled.(7)
Economies of scale in production play a role in the opera-
tion of a SSS. Building a sound and efﬁ  cient  SSS  may 
entail considerable ﬁ  xed costs. These may consist of costs 
for construction and maintenance of the core system 
(IT, etc.) and costs (legal, etc.) for accessing foreign CSDs 
and thus increasing the number of securities that users 
are potentially able to hold and process in the system. 
But once the system and the links are in place, the cost 
of adding an additional user and/or security, supposing 
it belongs to a category already held/processed by the 
system, may be negligible.
An SSS can be considered as a network, but so can a group 
of SSSs. A logical question is whether SSSs have an interest 
in extending the network they use by making their services 
compatible with each other. Alternatively, locking-in users 
could be used as a strategy. Besides the fact that a user does 
not always have a choice with regard to the SSS it may use 
to settle a given security, the cost of switching one SSS for 
another can be signiﬁ  cant. The system users are thus said to 
be locked-in. Switching costs are inﬂ  uenced by several fac-
tors. They may include contractual and loyalty costs, training 
and learning, data conversion and IT-system adaptation costs 
and search costs. Switching costs can affect price competi-
tion in two ways. Locked-in users may be subject to price 
increases, and new users may be offered discounts.
A distinction is often also made between vertical and hori-
zontal integration models. Vertically integrated structures 
are said to derive efﬁ   ciency (operational cost savings) 
from a STP mechanism, the smooth successive operation 
of trade and post-trade processing. One user-friendly ele-
ment comprises the “single interface”, where the instruc-
tion to generate the trade is automatically used as a feed 
for clearing and settlement purposes. For example, the 
exchange can, on behalf of the trading member, send the 
necessary instructions automatically to the clearing house 
and the clearing members involved, and so on. However, 
in the current technical environment, increasing stan-
dardisation and decreasing communication costs no 
longer require a single integrated silo to apply STP. 
Sending instructions to several systems becomes manage-
able, and the single and exclusive vertical chain in process-
ing the trade is no longer an absolute value-added in this 
respect (Lannoo, K. and Levin, M., 2001). Possible settle-
ment models in this context are presented in box 2.
On the other hand, horizontal integration makes it possi-
ble to clear and/or settle all trades in the same system. The 
“CCP as an hourglass”-model contained in box 2 is an 
example at clearing-level. At settlement-level, things will 
probably move faster for the investor than for the issuer, 
as it is likely that the “notary”/registrar CSD function will 
remain domestic in the short to medium term, due to 
legal complexities, and the issuer will not immediately be 
able to choose the location of the desired service, nor will 
these facilities be merged in the short term. Meanwhile, 
this will not necessarily preclude the integration of the set-
tlement services activity of different CSDs/SSSs.
While the driving forces behind the consolidation process 
are clear, it is difﬁ  cult at this stage to determine a priori in 
which direction it will evolve. Box 2 contains a short pres-
entation of some of the models that could emerge from 
this process.
(6)  With regard to networks and network characteristics in general, see e.g. Shy, O. 
(2001), Economides, N. (1996), and Katz, M.L. and Shapiro, C. (1994).
(7)  See, in this respect, Cruickshank, D. (2001), who defends on this basis a com-
pletely uniﬁ  ed utility at EU level for  clearing and settlement respectively.93
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Models for an integrated clearing and settlement infrastructure
Directly linked SSSs – Spaghetti model
A direct link connects two SSSs. Here, the SSS labelled “investor SSS” is a direct participant of the “registrar SSS / CSD”. 
This model was proposed by the European Central Securities Depository Association (2000) white paper that advocated 
direct bilateral links between CSDs. If each SSS wants to hold all securities, this model requires a maximum number of 
links. Dubbed as the “spaghetti model”, it was never fully implemented.
Directly linked SSSs – Hub and spokes model
A more concentrated model, requiring a minimum number of links, is the hub and spokes model. This model was 
presented by Euroclear (1999). Cross-border business would be concentrated in the hub and domestic business in 
the spokes, that also continue to act as a registrar CSD. A corollary of this model is that internal settlement of all the 
securities held in each registrar CSD will only be possible between direct hub SSS participants. Registrar CSD partici-









This proposal has been made by both CSDs and ICSDs. Here, an “investor SSS” is linked indirectly to a “registrar 
SSS” via a so-called “middle” SSS. In this model, the investor SSS only needs one link to the hub to indirectly hold 




CCP as an hourglass between markets and SSSs
A CCP, interposing itself between the buyer and the seller, can act as a pivot connecting several domestic markets 
and several domestic SSSs. In principle, one or several such CCPs could co-exist. A “one CCP for the EU-zone”-
project was presented in the European Securities Forum (2000) paper. The advantage at clearing level will be that 
a sole CCP nets its members’ transactions irrespective of the market where the transaction is concluded. So, if a 
clearing member buys a security on the exchange, and sells the same amount of that security on another exchange 
or OTC, its net securities position vis-à-vis the CCP will be zero. This netting effect of the CCP will reduce the 
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2.3  How to limit the power of a dominant utility
When dominant structures emerge, their power can be 
counterbalanced in two ways. First, the industry should 
be properly organised, guaranteeing strict conditions 
of access to the essential facility functions correspond-
ing to the natural monopoly functions of the industry 
while opening all other aspects to competition. Second, 
adequate governance structures should ensure that the 
interests of users are genuinely taken into account.
2.3.1  Essential facilities and compulsory access
An essential facility is that part of a service considered sub-
optimal to duplicate, given the existing technologies, and 
exclusion from that facility would place competitors in the 
“downstream” market at a signiﬁ  cant disadvantage.
The experience of the telephony sector can provide an 
example. Until the 1980s, telephony was considered a 
“natural” monopoly. As a consequence, governments 
licensed a single company to deliver the service and regu-
lated its price on a production cost basis. This approach 
was called into question recently, as it was recognised that 
the promotion of more competition would allow consum-
ers to receive a better service or to pay less. At present, 
only the existing local wiring network is considered to be 
a natural monopoly, i.e. an essential facility. Compulsory 
access and access-pricing rules were imposed with regard 
to the essential facility, thus enabling rival long-distance 
connection companies to compete in their “downstream” 
market. At the same time, companies that are granted 
access to the local connection services provided by the 
local wiring network operators are able to offer substi-
tute services or to develop complementary ones, such 
as ADSL services, so that innovation is not hampered. 
(Shy, O., 2001).
It would take too long to detail here the precise conditions 
for applying the essential facilities concept, but this con-
cept is used in both US and EU competition law, although 
in different ways. EU courts usually analyse essential facil-
ity cases in terms of a refusal-to-deal, as envisaged under 
Art. 86  of the EU Treaty that prohibits the abuse of a 
dominant position (Harz, M., 1997).
Milne, A (2002) defends a similar approach for the securi-
ties settlement industry where some core functions, i.e. 
the core registrar CSD monopolies of both securities book 
transfer and communication of corporate actions, are 
treated as essential facilities. Because a security ultimately 
exists only in one depository, and because the issuer com-
municates solely with that depository, it is impossible 
to duplicate this service. Registrar CSDs should account 
separately for these functions and allow access on a non-
discriminatory basis to a wide range of eligible members. 
This unbundling of functions would avoid cross-subsidisa-
tion between essential facilities and other services. If this 
condition is fulﬁ  lled, the registrar CSD itself and all of its 
members should be able to compete for settlement serv-
ices in the “downstream” market. Thus, the infrastructure 
itself should be entitled to compete with its users, once 
the essential facility functions which it operates can be 
accessed in a non-discriminatory and fair way.
In the speciﬁ  c context of SSSs, the fact that the infrastruc-
ture itself competes with its users might also be a way 
to avoid excessive tiering. An infrastructure offering an 
efﬁ  cient service complying with strict soundness criteria 
might see its attractiveness reduced if it cannot compete 
on a reasonable basis with its participants. Reference 
could be made here to the settlement of US Treasuries 
where, due to the restriction of services at the level of 
the Fedwire SSS, the bulk of settlement activity is con-
centrated on a second tier with two big participants of 
this settlement system. This seems to have raised some 
concern as the Federal Reserve System and the Securities 
and Exchange Commission launched an industry consulta-
tion on the impact this has on the resilience of the overall 
Treasuries settlement infrastructure in their interagency 
white paper (May 2002).
2.3.2 Governance  issues
The organisation of the governance of the system is an 
important tool and enables users to have their say in the 
design and management of the system.
Traditionally, many systems have been structured as joint 
ventures where system members have their say. Even 
today, when demutualisation takes place, this remains 
a valuable principle. Members can be expected to give 
more attention to the risk management of a system than 
non-member shareholders. Likewise, in a situation where 
the system has a monopoly position, the inﬂ  uence  of 
users in the design and the management of the system 
should provide the necessary counterbalancing powers to 
the possibility of an excessive pricing policy. Both these 
elements favour the implementation of user govern-
ance, which is also the approach of the CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations for SSSs.
At the same time, it is clear that user governance also has 
its limits. As cross-border trade activity grows, the number 
of potential remote participants with speciﬁ  c interests in the 
design of the system will increase. But if remote participants 
access a system indirectly via a local intermediary they are, 
by deﬁ  nition, not represented in the system’s governance96
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Legal risk
1. Legal framework
Securities settlement systems should have a well founded, clear and transparent legal basis in the relevant 
jurisdictions.
Pre-settlement risk
2. Trade conﬁ  rmation
Conﬁ  rmation of trades between direct market participants should occur as soon as possible after trade execu-
tion, but no later than trade date (T + 0). Where conﬁ  rmation of trades by indirect market participants (such as 
institutional investors) is required, it should occur as soon as possible after trade execution, preferably on T + 0, 
but no later than T + 1.
3. Settlement cycles
Rolling settlement should be adopted in all securities markets. Final settlement should occur no later than T + 3. 
The beneﬁ  ts and costs of a settlement cycle shorter than T + 3 should be evaluated.
arrangements. This can be a problem to the extent that 
it is in the members’ interest to restrict access and so to 
be able to act as intermediary for the services offered by 
the system. In this context, the demutualisation and list-
ing of some EU exchanges, where it is no longer neces-
sary for all exchange owners to be members, may have a 
beneﬁ  cial impact on the restructuring of the industry. But 
non-member shareholders will try to maximise the proﬁ  t 
for the system rather than the members. Thus, the genuine 
interests of members should be taken into account at the 
same time. It should also be recalled here that users are not 
a uniform category, and that, for example, users generating 
larger volumes will usually matter more.
When the post-trade systems are part of an integrated 
silo of trading-clearing-settlement, speciﬁ  c issues arise. 
Firstly, the exchange can more easily abuse its power by 
only accepting its own trades to be settled in its own 
settlement system. One argument sometimes presented 
in favour of such exclusivity is that other exchanges or 
alternative trading systems listing the same securities 
should not receive a “free lunch” by being able to 
access the post-trade system. However, should the 
post-trade system be independent of the exchange, 
its prime interest would be to attract as much settle-
ment volume as possible, irrespective of the platform 
where the trade is concluded. Secondly, in the case of 
common ownership of a vertical integrated structure, 
cross-subsidisation of the trading, clearing and settle-
ment services offered might take place. Trade and post-
trade handling costs should be split and assigned to the 
parties involved in a fair way.
3. Soundness  considerations
3.1 CPSS-IOSCO  Recommendations
Both securities commissions and central banks are paying 
great attention to the soundness of the post-trade 
processing of securities transactions in order to reduce 
the systemic risk, i.e. the risk that the inability of one 
institution to meet its obligations when due will result in 
other institutions becoming unable to meet their obliga-
tions. The CPSS-IOSCO Task Force has established a list 
of recommendations for securities settlement systems 
recorded in box 3. Those recommendations are now in 
the process of being adapted to the EU environment by 
the ESCB-CESR Task Force.
As can be seen from the CPSS-IOSCO recommenda-
tions, authorities are concerned not only with the 
soundness of settlement services but also with their 
efﬁ  ciency. Furthermore, these recommendations target 
the settlement of both domestic trades and cross-
border trades, the latter frequently involving more than 
one system.
Box 397
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4. Central counterparties (CCPs)
The beneﬁ  ts and costs of a CCP should be evaluated. Where such a mechanism is introduced, the CCP should 
rigorously control the risks it assumes.
5. Securities lending
Securities lending and borrowing (or repurchase agreements and other economically equivalent transactions) 
should be encouraged as a method for expediting the settlement of securities transactions. Barriers that inhibit 
the practice of lending securities for this purpose should be removed.
Settlement risk
6. Central securities depositories (CSDs)
Securities should be immobilised or dematerialised and transferred by book entry in CSDs to the greatest extent
possible.
7. Delivery versus payment (DVP)
CSDs should eliminate principal risk by linking securities transfers to funds transfers in a way that achieves delivery 
versus payment.
8. Timing of settlement ﬁ  nality
Final settlement should occur no later than the end of the settlement day. Intraday or real-time ﬁ  nality should be 
provided where necessary to reduce risks.
9. CSD risk controls to address participants’ failures to settle
CSDs that extend intraday credit to participants, including CSDs that operate net settlement systems, should institute 
risk controls that, at a minimum, ensure timely settlement in the event that the participant with the largest payment 
obligation is unable to settle. The most reliable set of controls is a combination of collateral requirements and limits.
10. Cash settlement assets
Assets used to settle the ultimate payment obligations arising from securities transactions should carry little or no credit 
or liquidity risk. If central bank money is not used, steps must be taken to protect CSD members from potential losses 
and liquidity pressures arising from the failure of the cash settlement agent whose assets are used for that purpose.
Operational risk
11. Operational reliability
Sources of operational risk arising in the clearing and settlement process should be identiﬁ  ed and minimised 
through the development of appropriate systems, controls and procedures. Systems should be reliable and secure, 
and have adequate, scalable capacity. Contingency plans and backup facilities should be established to allow for 
timely recovery of operations and completion of the settlement process.
Custody risk
12. Protection of customers’ securities
Entities holding securities in custody should employ accounting practices and safekeeping procedures that fully 




Governance arrangements for CSDs and CCPs should be designed to fulﬁ  l public interest requirements and to 
promote the objectives of owners and users.
14. Access
CSDs and CCPs should have objective and publicly disclosed criteria for participation that permit fair and open 
access.
15. Efﬁ  ciency
While maintaining safe and secure operations, securities settlement systems should be cost-effective in meeting 
the requirements of users.
16. Communication procedures and standards
Securities settlement systems should use or accommodate the relevant international communication procedures 
and standards in order to facilitate efﬁ  cient settlement of cross-border transactions.
17. Transparency
CSDs and CCPs should provide market participants with sufﬁ  cient information for them to identify and evaluate 
accurately the risks and costs associated with using the CSD or CCP services.
18. Regulation and oversight
Securities settlement systems should be subject to transparent and effective regulation and oversight. Central 
banks and securities regulators should cooperate with each other and with other relevant authorities.
19. Risks in cross-border links
CSDs that establish links to settle cross-border trades should design and operate such links to reduce effectively 
the risks associated with cross-border settlements.
Both the co-operation between systems and their con-
solidation raise risk aspects as, in term of soundness, 
size will generally matter. When an individual system 
grows or when systems integrate, the probability of 
disruption may well decrease but its potential impact on 
systemic stability could become much more important. 
Supervisors and overseers will have to be particularly 
attentive when considering low probability risks of cata-
strophic events. At the same time, it could be argued 
that an integrated infrastructure will imply fewer service 
providers, and that it will be easier for the supervisor to 
monitor such a system.
As efﬁ  ciency considerations have been discussed in the 
previous chapter, this chapter will concentrate on sound-
ness issues related more speciﬁ   cally to cross-border 
trades, taking some selected CPSS-IOSCO Task Force 
Recommendations as a guideline.
3.2  Legal soundness (Recommendation 1)
Recommendation 1 requires SSSs to have a well founded, 
transparent legal basis in all relevant jurisdictions, setting a 
requirement that underpins all further recommendations. 
For cross-border settlement, conﬂ  ict of law rules should 
clearly indicate the law applicable. This referencing law is 
speciﬁ  cally relevant in the current EU legal environment 
composed of sometimes very heterogeneous national juris-
dictions. At the same time, further harmonisation of exist-
ing laws is highly desirable. In some speciﬁ  c ﬁ  elds relating 
to clearing and settlement, general principles have already 
been harmonised or are in the process of harmonisation, 
as is testiﬁ  ed by the EU Settlement Finality Directive and 
the Collateral Directive. The Giovannini II report advocates 
a harmonised EU securities law, also regulating the issu-
ance and characteristics of securities. From a soundness 
point of view, it is important to avoid a race to the bottom. 
A harmonised legal and regulatory environment will 
prevent settlement providers competing by applying less 
stringent risk management standards.99
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3.3  Settlement cycles (Recommendation 3)
Recommendation 3 promotes a rolling settlement cycle of 
three working days after the trade day. Here, the market 
rule depends on the technical capabilities of the post-trade 
environment. Shorter settlement cycles do reduce the risk 
that market members incur between trade and settlement 
date, but can prove to be counterproductive if they result in 
a strong increase in the number of settlement failures. The 
more complex and fragmented the post-trade settlement 
infrastructure, the greater the risk of such failure.
Furthermore, an integrated EU capital market requires 
harmonisation of the settlement cycles, which currently 
differ between securities markets. Clearly, there will be a 
second trade-off between the advantages of harmonisa-
tion and those of shorter settlement cycles, as harmoni-
sation could require the lengthening of the settlement 
cycles for some securities trades.
3.4  Use of CCPs (Recommendation 4)
Recommendation 4 states that the beneﬁ  ts and costs of the 
use of a central counterparty (CCP) should be assessed.
The use of a CCP has the potential to reduce systemic risk, 
as the intervention of a CCP usually has a strong impact 
on the subsequent settlement activity. To the extent that 
trades are netted, immediate (T + 0) settlement occurs de 
facto for these parts of the trades that are crossed-out, as 
compared to T + 3 settlement for most long-term securi-
ties cash market trades.
The netting process of a CCP is optimal when its clear-
ing members are allowed to clear and net all their trades 
in a given security through the CCP, and not exclusively 
the trades executed on a particular exchange. Hence 
the obvious attractiveness, equally from a risk manage-
ment point of view, of the “one CCP for the EU-zone”-
project. Smaller overall net positions vis-à-vis one CCP 
will also reduce the need for collateral from the clearing 
member.
On the other hand, it is clear that any further concentra-
tion of CCPs, or even a single CCP for the EU, would 
concentrate clearing risks and increase the impact of a 
default by the clearing house. A model of a CCP acting 
as an hourglass between markets and SSSs is presented 
in box 2. Given the CCP’s pivot position, any disruption 
at that level could impact several markets and/or SSSs. 
Currently, the CPSS-IOSCO Task Force is in the process 
of elaborating a set of standards speciﬁ  cally aimed at 
CCPs.
3.5  Risk controls (Recommendation 9) and Cash 
settlement assets (Recommendation 10)
When an SSS extends intra-day credit to its participants 
or operates a net settlement system, Recommendation 
9  envisages that the system must be able to continue 
operating in the event of default by its largest participant. 
This constraint should increase in a consolidated system 
which will normally face higher positions and transaction 
volumes from its participants.
To offer settlement at cross-border level in an integrated 
entity, risk minimisation and operational cost savings 
should be reconciled. On the cash side, if central bank 
money or credit is not used, Recommendation 10 accepts 
as an alternative that the SSS may be a so-called limited 
purpose bank (LPB). An LPB is, by deﬁ  nition, exposed to a 
smaller range of risks as it limits the scope of its activities, 
compared with a full purpose bank. An LPB is also required 
to fully mitigate its credit extension. Such a structure offers 
a welcome alternative to a system where the central bank 
would be the sole possible settlement agent. Indeed, not 
all system participants have access to central bank accounts 
and credit. Besides, decentralisation in the execution of 
the Eurosystem monetary policy implies that the various 
national central banks (NCBs) may grant credit exclusively 
to their own domestic participants. The LPB structure offers 
a valuable solution, enabling the LPB both to offer cash 
accounts and to provide cash credit to all participants. Of 
course this format, that is also discussed in the Federal 
Reserve System and Securities and Exchange Commission 
Interagency white paper (May  2002), should be clearly 
deﬁ  ned and open to all interested parties.
3.6  Operational reliability (Recommendation 11)
Recommendation 11  looks at the operational reliability 
of a settlement system. When systems become interoper-
able, the sound design of their common interfaces and 
procedures becomes all the more critical because of their 
widespread use. Interoperability could facilitate the organ-
isation of contingency plans, as the various systems could 
be used as mutual back-up facilities in case of a calamity. 
However, this option should be carefully assessed, and it 
might prove less workable or desirable than a standard 
contingency arrangement.
Contingency planning will become more crucial in the 
case of consolidation, as disruption of a consolidated 
system settling higher volumes and servicing more mar-
kets than any of the individual systems existing before 
will potentially have a bigger systemic impact, with 
contagion spreading more rapidly between the markets 100
it serves. The requirements set for the contingency plans 
of such a system should reﬂ  ect this. In this respect, the 
April 2003 Interagency white paper on sound practices 
to strengthen the resilience of the U.S. ﬁ  nancial system, 
a post 11 September exercise, calls for the identiﬁ  cation 
of clearing and settlement activities in support of critical 
ﬁ  nancial markets, and sets precise time-related and geo-
graphical criteria for contingency arrangements for both 
industry facilities and other ﬁ  rms that play a signiﬁ  cant 
role in clearing and settlement.
3.7 Governance  (Recommendation  13)
Recommendation 13 explicitly addresses user governance. 
Since a monopoly-inclined entity – such as an SSS – might 
let its own interests prevail, there must be an appropri-
ate system for balancing the stakeholders’ interests. The 
recommendation states that the users of the SSS should 
be sufﬁ  ciently involved to have a say in its design and 
management. Users need to have a clear insight into the 
risks and costs of the system they use.
3.8  Linked SSSs (Recommendation 19)
Recommendation 19  speciﬁ   cally looks at the design 
and functioning of links between CSDs. When systems 
become interrelated, systems and system links should be 
designed and managed in a way that, as far as possible, 
avoids contagion between markets and/or systems. All 
legal consequences have to be scrutinised, and possible 
conﬂ  icts of law between the jurisdictions involved have 
to be avoided. Of utmost importance is the timing of 
settlement ﬁ  nality in linked systems, so as to ensure that 
securities received by a system are only further processed 
after the transfer has become ﬁ  nal in the ﬁ  rst system. 
Operationally speaking, the settlement of trades via 
links will be more demanding as compared to in-system 
settlement. For example, DvP-settlement between par-
ticipants in different systems will be more complex. 
The realignment of securities positions held in different 
systems will have to take place up to the level of the 
system in which the security is transferred. Also, the 
reconciliation of securities positions will become more 
demanding, as it will have to take place at each holding 
level. Finally, the models of linked SSSs presented in box 
2 illustrate that de facto hubs may emerge among those 
linked SSSs. If so, any disruption at the level of the hub 
SSS could potentially impact on the functioning of any 
other SSS linked to this hub.
3.9  Field of application of the recommendations
A ﬁ  nal relevant issue is the ﬁ  eld of application of existing 
or future recommendations for clearing and settlement. 
This question concerns in particular quasi-systems. Their 
emergence might have adverse implications if the risks are 
not appropriately managed by the quasi-system.
A settlement system – irrespective of the nature of the 
institution(s) performing this function – should ideally 
be capable of both offering cash accounts and securi-
ties accounts for system participants, and providing cash 
credit and securities lending facilities at short notice. If 
one of these four functions ceased to be part of the 
settlement service, the services offered to a system user 
could clearly be considered as suboptimal from the client’s 
point of view. In an environment where alternatives are 
available, the system will probably lose its customers to 
the sub-level where these same services are offered in a 
suitable way, i.e. tiering will occur. This can be problematic 
from a risk point of view, as the bulk of settlement activity 
might switch to institutions that have a less stringent risk 
proﬁ  le. The overall systemic risk will increase.
Traditionally, the standards for SSSs are intended for 
CSD/NCB-combinations and ICSDs. It is these systems 
that settle the bulk of securities trades and form the 
main focus of overseers. Likewise, in the EU, only SSSs 
have been designated and protected in the framework 
of the EU Settlement Finality Directive. In the current EU 
environment, quasi-systems become more important and 
can have a substantial settlement activity. Already, the 
CPSS/IOSCO Recommendations for SSSs are not conﬁ  ned 
to systems but are also in part applicable to custodians. 
Current discussions focus on the possible need to go 
further and to apply a so-called functional approach to 
settlement service providers, implying that comparable 
standards should apply to entities exercising comparable 
functions and whose overall systemic risk level is consid-
ered to be equally high. Precise criteria which should be 
used to decide on the systemic relevance of the entities 
concerned still have to be agreed upon.
Conclusion
The creation of a more integrated environment for the 
post-trade handling of securities is an important prerequi-
site for obtaining a truly integrated EU capital market by 
2005, as envisaged in the European Commission’s action 
plan. Today, the clearing and settlement of domestic trades 
between local participants is well organised. However, the 
settling of EU cross-border trades via the same channels 
is generally perceived to be inefﬁ  cient and too expensive. 101
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Some twenty central securities depositories, each holding 
domestic securities, are active throughout the EU. This 
causes considerable direct and indirect costs for interme-
diaries, investors and issuers.
To give the integration movement a chance, there is a gen-
eral consensus that the solution should be market-led but 
that the authorities should step in if necessary. One impor-
tant way to bring down the cost is to make securities clear-
ing and settlement systems interoperable, giving investors 
or their agents comparable access to different systems.
Furthermore, a market-led solution requires that the exist-
ing barriers to competition should be abolished. These 
barriers are known, as the Giovannini reports identiﬁ  ed 
the market practices, tax-related procedures and legal 
issues involved. The removal of these barriers should ulti-
mately lead to a free choice of settlement location for the 
investor and the issuer.
For securities clearing and settlement services, both con-
sumption network externalities and production econo-
mies of scale are present. Their existence might ultimately 
lead to the emergence of very large service providers, and 
eventually, to a regional or EU-wide monopoly. In that 
case, there is a risk that the users of the system will not 
get the full beneﬁ  t of the enhanced clearing and settle-
ment services structure, and there is a need for devices to 
prevent this.
On the one hand, settlement systems themselves and cus-
todians should have the right to access the services of the 
registrar CSDs that are perceived to be essential facilities, 
i.e. the securities book transfer function and the com-
munication of corporate actions. Without non-discrimina-
tory and fair access to these functions, competition will 
be restricted. When this condition is fulﬁ  lled, settlement 
systems will be truly able to compete with each other and 
with custodians. Likewise, under this condition, a vertical 
silo of trading-clearing-settlement that is owned by an 
exchange, would not be able to hinder competing rivals 
and the overall integration movement.
On the other hand, since a monopolistic entity – such as 
an SSS – might let its own interests prevail, there must 
be an appropriate system for balancing the stakeholders 
interests. It will be of utmost importance to structure the 
governance properly so that users have a say in the design 
and management of the SSS.
Besides efﬁ   ciency concerns, soundness considera-
tions will shape the clearing and settlement industry. 
Authorities must pay particular attention to the low 
probability risks of catastrophic events that could 
destabilise the whole ﬁ  nancial system. The CPSS-IOSCO 
Recommendations on securities settlement systems do 
cope with this concern in both a domestic and a cross-
border context. In a cross-border context, links between 
systems should be soundly constructed. Furthermore, 
when systems integrate, it is necessary to take account 
of the fact that any default will have a potentially bigger 
impact. Finally, in a changing environment, clearing and 
settlement service providers equalling or exceeding the 
importance of some SSSs from a systemic risk point of 
view should be asked to comply with standards compa-
rable to those imposed on SSSs.102
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